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1 Introduction
Collaboration and teamwork play an important role in supporting business processes within
an organization.1 However, when vested interests are at work, firms often have difficulty in
coordinating their workers. For instance, the marketing department anticipates new marketing
channels through mobile computing and social networks, and the IT department develops new
technology to implement these ideas. However, decisions favored by one department may not
be preferred by the other, for example, the IT department favors sophisticated design, while
the marketing department prefers simplicity and user-friendliness. If the two departments do
not coordinate and release a technical product that consumers do not like, it will hurt the
firm’s profits. To improve coordination, the firm may hire a leader (e.g. through promoting
∗I thank Paul Belleflamme, Giacomo Calzolari, Jacques Cre´mer, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Axel Gautier, and Ed
Hopkins for their helpful comments. I also acknowledge the support of Toulouse School of Economics and
University of Bologna in earlier versions of this work. Any opinions expressed are those of the author only.
†University of Liege (ULg), HEC Management School, Liege Competition and Innovation Institute (LCII).
E-mail: wingmanwynne.lam@ulg.ac.be
1A survey of Accenture (2014) shows a growing collaboration between the IT and marketing departments
in recent years.
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one department head, the CIO or the CMO, to CEO to oversee all departments of the firm),2
but this raises some concern over status, which, in turn, affects the behavior of workers. For
example, some firms offer lavish perks ranging from large and well-equipped offices, private
jets, chauffeur-driven cars to country club memberships to their senior management. On the
one hand, workers on the lower layer, knowing that the senior management earns significantly
more benefits than them, will work hard to get promoted to these positions. On the other hand,
lower-status workers may see these differences as unfair treatment, and they are therefore less
willing to cooperate with the higher-status workers. As a consequence, it is optimal to introduce
some status differentiation, but not too much.
Status can more generally affect the optimal organizational structure. Some interesting
questions include how does status affect the design of jobs on the career ladder and, in partic-
ular, should promotions involve empowering the leader to take a very different role or a similar
role? Moreover, under what conditions it is profitable for the firm to introduce status differ-
entiation? My results suggest that when promotions involve a change in job responsibilities,
status differential is more beneficial, compared to the absence of such a change, as the power
to make recommendations allows the leader to align the objectives of different parties more
closely, possibly outweighing the coordination distortion caused by an increase in status differ-
entiation. This explains why in practice some workers receive longer vacation, have access to
more spacious office and better equipment, and enjoy other luxurious perks by simply having
worked longer in a company; and why this is even more so when the roles of the leaders change
upon promotion.
This paper presents a model, where agents care about their relative positions in the firm,
to study the impact of status on coordination and promotions in organizations. I consider
an organization with two workers, who need to cooperate with each other, but each of them
has their own vested interest. The firm can choose whether to promote one of the workers
as a leader. In the case of no promotion, both workers have identical status; in the case of
promotion, the leader has a higher status than the follower. The sociological and managerial
literature shows that having high status often comes with a variety of advantages: a high
status worker might have a cost advantage (Podolny, 1993) and/or more power (Castellucci
and Piazza, 2013). Therefore, I consider two consequences of status: First, higher status
decreases the cost of the leader but increases the cost of the follower. This could be due to the
fact that the leader has better access to resources, which makes his job easier to do, than the
follower. Second, status empowers the leader to instruct the follower what action to take, who
decides whether to obey or ignore it. In case of disobedience, the follower incurs a cost, and
such cost increases with the status level of the leader. These two elements will be discussed
separately in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The objective of the firm is to choose the organization that
maximizes its profit, which is determined by how well the two workers cooperate.
I show that having a leader improves the coordination between workers, but it creates status
differentiation, which distorts production with respect to the first-best level. As a result, the
2Recent experimental studies find that higher-status individuals have a significant impact on lower-status
individuals, and therefore status can help solve coordination problems (Eckel and Wilson, 2007; Eckel et al.,
2010).
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firm benefits from introducing some status differentiation, but not too much. In the case where
the leader does not have authority over the follower, the firm is better off only when status
differential brings more cost advantage to the leader than cost disadvantage to the follower
(see Propositions 1 and 2). In the case where the leader also has authority over the follower,
status differentiation is preferred even when the follower suffers a slightly larger loss than the
gain enjoyed by the leader. This is because the leader has an additional instrument, which is
the power to make recommendations, to improve coordination (see Proposition 3). This result
has interesting implications for the design of employees’ tasks in promotions: if promotion
involves changes in responsibilities, for example, from routine tasks performed by junior work-
ers to supervisory or more creative tasks performed by managers, the firm may benefit from
introducing more differential treatment between senior and junior employees compared to the
case where responsibilities remain the same on the promotion ladder. An implication is that
firms should offer more flexible remuneration packages the inclusion of non-monetary benefits
can improve their profits under two conditions: when status affects workers in an asymmetric
way, and when status comes with authority.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper extends the literature in three ways. First, the literature on status focuses either
on the work motivation effect of status, or on the signaling effect of status, but not on the
effect of status on coordination. On work motivation, theories in the tournament literature
show that when agents care about their relative ranking in organizations, status can be used
to provide work incentives (Moldovanu et al., 2007; Auriol and Renault, 2008; Dubey and
Geanakoplos, 2010). Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) further distinguish the effect of inequality
of rewards and endowments on incentives, and show that different types of inequality have
opposite effects. However, the tournament literature treats agents separately, while this paper
provides a model that explains the effect of status on coordination by allowing agents to work
in teams. On signaling, the literature shows that status can generally improve the matching
of workers and firms (Fershtman, Hvide, and Weiss, 2006; Truyts, 2010). Since matching
is positively assortative, meaning the best job is allocated to the most successful candidate,
workers will care about their relative position in the population. But again, their focus on
matching is very different from the emphasis on coordination here.
Second, the literature on status usually assumes that agents care about status, but this
paper, instead of taking status as exogenously given, focuses on the effect of status—through
changing the cost of effort and/or authority over other workers—on coordination and pro-
motions.3 In the case of lower costs, status differential comes from the leader’s access to
non-monetary privileges, for example, having larger networks of contacts is an effective way
of driving business processes more smoothly, and thereby lowers the leader’s cost of effort.
In the case of higher authority, the leader’s power to make recommendations creates status
differential. Indeed, the importance of status for explaining behavior has long been recognized
3Postlewaite (1998) compares different approaches to model status: people either value status itself or seek
status for other purpose. I follow the latter approach.
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(Veblen, 1934; Frank, 1985). Frank (1984) shows empirically that workers care about their
relative ranking in a company. In particular, workers at the top are willing to accept a wage
that is smaller than their productivity for being at the top. However, this literature typically
focuses is on the use of monetary incentives (see also Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 1989;
Lazear, 1991), while this paper focuses more on non-monetary sources of status, such as non-
monetary perks and greater influence. This seems more realistic because plenty of evidence
shows that relative concerns, not only in terms of income, but also in terms of property, cars,
and fashion matter for human behavior—as noted by Hirsch (1976).
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on internal organization of firms, which stud-
ies coordination vs. specialization. See, for example, Hart and Moore (2005), Dessein and
Santos (2006), and Alonso et al. (2008), although they do not consider status. For surveys on
promotions, see Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Waldman (2013), and Lazear and Oyer (2013).
Also see Fama (1980), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and Holmstro¨m (1999), who provide mod-
els that explain how the prospect of promotion creates incentives but who do not focus on
coordination. In summary, standard models on status and promotions capture work incentives
but lack coordination between workers; standard models on internal organization allow coordi-
nation but lack status. This paper explores the interaction between these interesting features,
which the literature to this point has largely ignored.
2 Model
Consider an organization with two workers, 1 and 2, who take actions a ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ [0, 1]
respectively. The success of the organization depends on the coordination between the two
workers: the firm obtains a value of one with probability 1− (a−b)2, which is maximized when
a = b.4 The revenue is shared equally between the two workers.5 For example, revenue sharing
schemes are commonly used in partnerships, joint ventures, and cooperatives.
Let s denote the status of the worker. Status is valued in relative terms: if worker 1 has
status s, then worker 2 has status −s. Status and costs are complementary, and status affects
the cost of action for the workers in two ways. First, there is a coordination cost. More
specifically, worker 1 bears a cost of f(s)(1 − a)2 for taking action a, whereas worker 2 bears
f(s)b2 for taking action b. Assuming such a cost function has two implications. First, the
cost-minimizing action is a = 1 for worker 1, and b = 0 for worker 2, meaning each worker has
a vested interest in the optimal action. Second, both workers’ costs depend on their status in
the firm. Assume f ′(s) < 0, so that it is less costly for the worker with higher status to take
action, which can be interpreted as it is less costly for the leader to take action because he
has better access to certain contacts or resources. Assume also f(0) = 1, so that when there
4Although the value of the action does not affect the gross revenue, it affects the net profit, as will be
discussed in the first-best case below.
5A change in bargaining power further from one-half does not affect the results qualitatively, as does the
introduction of wages such as performance pay based on revenue. These variations would only reduce coordina-
tion, but it would not change how status affects incentives. Thus, for expositional simplicity, I focus on equal
shares.
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is no status differential, both workers’ marginal cost of deviating from their ideal action is the
same. Although the assumption that status is complementary with costs is widely used in the
literature (see, for instance, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Auriol and Renault, 2008), I will
discuss this assumption in more detail in Section 3.
Second, there is a disobedience cost. More specifically, status may empower the leader (the
agent with s > 0) to get his way by making a recommendation to the follower (the agent with
s < 0). Suppose that worker 1 is the leader. Although worker 2 has effective control over
action b, worker 1 may make a recommendation bl, which worker 2 is free to ignore. However,
if worker 2 decides to disobey worker 1, he incurs an additional cost of g(s)(b− bl)2.6 Assume
g′(s) > 0, so that the lower status the worker has, the higher the cost of disobeying. Assume
also g(0) = 0, meaning the cost of disobeying is zero when there is no status differential, i.e.
s = 0. For simplicity, assume that g(s) = s.
Thus, the costs of workers 1 and 2, denoted c1(s, a) and c2(s, b) respectively, are given by
c1(s, a) = f(s)(1− a)2,
and
c2(s, b) = f(−s)b2 + s(b− bl)2.
I do not consider monetary transfers. Instead I focus on non-monetary sources of status,
which is an interesting issue because non-monetary incentives are widely used in practice.
For example, “cafeteria plans”, under which workers may receive different benefit packages in
terms of day offs, access to company cars, office space and IT equipment, priority in choosing
different things, etc., exist in Belgium, and it is under discussion about how to implement these
non-monetary benefits.7
The value of the organization is defined by the total value created minus the total costs:
piorg = 1− (a− b)2 − (1− a)2 − b2. (1)
Notice that piorg depends only on the absolute cost of taking actions, but not how status
affects each worker’s perceived cost. This is either because the firm does not care about the
psychological effects of status, but workers do care about them, or because the firm only cares
about profit in monetary terms, but not the favorable treatment that status gives, which may
take non-monetary forms of group memberships or invitations to particular events.8
Consider the first-best situation where one agent chooses both actions a and b. He solves
max
a,b
(1− (a− b)2)− (1− a)2 − b2,
6We can reinterpret g(s)(b − bl)2 in a moral hazard framework, where b is an unobservable action, bl is an
order from a superior worker, and g(s) is a probability of monitoring. However, this paper focuses on how
status affects coordination, an issue that is not discussed in the moral hazard literature.
7See “Cafeteria plans—other personnel solutions,” KPMG, September 19 2012, available at http://www.
kpmg.com/be/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/pages/cafeteria-plans.aspx.
8In sociology, status is defined as a subjective judgment of ranking of individuals or groups. See Goldhamer
and Shils (1939) and Podolny (1993).
5
which yields the following optimal actions:
a∗FB =
2
3
; b∗FB =
1
3
.
Since there is only one agent, there is no concern for status, and f(0) = 1 and g(0) = 0.
2.1 Identical Status
The simplest case is when s = 0, the two workers work together as a “team”, meaning they
have identical status, and each worker chooses their own action. Since s = 0, f(0) = 1 and
g(0) = 0. Worker 1 chooses his action so as to maximize his expected payoff.
max
a
1
2
(1− (a− b)2)− (1− a)2.
Similarly, worker 2 solves
max
b
1
2
(1− (a− b)2)− b2.
The Nash equilibrium is given by
a∗team =
3
4
; b∗team =
1
4
.
The NE exhibits less coordination than the first-best because each worker obtains only half of
the benefits from coordination and each worker does not take into account the other worker’s
costs. The expected payoff for each worker is 5/16, and that for the team is 5/8.
2.2 Differentiated Status without Authority
Let us now examine the case where workers have different status, but without authority, i.e.
there is no bl. The case with bl will be discussed in Section 2.3. Suppose that worker 1 is
promoted to be the leader. Such promotion gives him entitlement to certain resources, and
thus it lowers his cost of action by f(s). As the follower, worker 2 does not have these privileges,
and thus his cost is increased by f(−s). Worker 1 therefore solves
max
a
1
2
(1− (a− b)2)− f(s)(1− a)2,
whereas worker 2 solves
max
b
1
2
(1− (a− b)2)− f(−s)b2.
The equilibrium actions are given by
a∗ =
2f(s)
1 + 2f(s)
+
f(s)
[f(s) + f(−s) + 2f(s)f(−s)](1 + 2f(s)) ,
b∗ =
f(s)
f(s) + f(−s) + 2f(s)f(−s) .
In the neighborhood of s = 0, we can show that
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Proposition 1. Without authority, introducing a small status differential increases the value
of the organization, piorg, compared to the case of identical status if
f ′(0+) < f ′(0−). (2)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The condition in Proposition 1 provides a simple rule to evaluate whether a firm should
differentiate status among workers. In particular, if the benefit of increasing a worker’s status
outweighs the cost of decreasing another worker’s status, then it is beneficial to introduce
a small status differential. For example, if an executive, who receives favorable treatments
that status gives (such as the possibility to travel in business class, enjoy more space and
better equipment in his office, and gain access to certain memberships or events), generates
more benefits through successful business deals, which outweighs the losses generated from a
junior employee, who does not receive these treatments, then it is profitable for the firm to
improve the status of senior management. This result also departs from standard models in the
literature, in that the literature usually considers a smooth distribution of status, meaning that
f ′(0+) = f ′(0−) here (see, for instance, Hopkins and Kornienko 2004; 2010). Upon examining
the asymmetric effects of status on the high- and the low-status workers, this model offers an
alternative reason for the introduction of status differential.
Indeed, it is easy to show that
Proposition 2. Without authority, when status has a symmetric effect on high- and low-status
workers (i.e. f ′(0+) = f ′(0−)), for any s, it always reduces the value of the organization, piorg.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 shows that if the benefit of increasing a worker’s status equals the cost of
decreasing another worker’s status, then it is desirable for the firm to push for equal treatment of
workers.9 This is because identical status reduces uncooperative behavior from the worker with
lower status: the larger the status differential is, the higher the cost of the low-status worker,
which, in turn, discourages cooperation. This result explains why firms have no incentive to
introduce status differential when the effect of status is smooth, and is complementary to the
literature, which has not considered the interaction between status and coordination.10
9Note that Propositions 1 and 2 hold provided the outside option is relatively small compared to the case
with identical status.
10For example, although the effect of status is smooth in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004; 2010), coordination
is absent. Dye (1984) and Lazear (1989) show that wage differentials not only provide incentives for productive
behavior, but also create incentives for sabotage, but they do not explicitly model status and coordination,
which is the focus of this paper.
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2.3 Authority
We examine another source of status differential—authority—in this section. Although the
allocation of authority has been studied previously in the literature on organizations (see,
for instance, Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Van den Steen, 2010), agents in these models do not
need to coordinate. More specifically, while the principal and the agent each has their own
preferred action in these models, they do not need to coordinate with each other. In contrast,
by incorporating coordination here, I can analyze how status and authority affect coordination
between workers.
Once again, suppose that worker 1 is the leader. He decides on action a as before, but now
he also makes a recommendation bl to worker 2. Introducing status has two effects: First, as
before, the leader’s cost of action is decreased by f(s) for being placed above another worker,
while the follower’s cost is increased by f(−s) for being placed below. Second, the follower
decides whether and to what extent to obey the leader’s suggestion and chooses the action b
he prefers. In case of b 6= bl, there is a cost of disobedience given by s(b− bl)2. In other words,
authority creates status differential: the more powerful the leader is, the higher the cost of
disobedience.
The payoff of the leader is
pil =
1
2
(1− (a− b)2)− f(s)(1− a)2,
and that of the follower is
pif =
1
2
(1− (a− b)2)− f(−s)b2 − s(b− bl)2.
Thus, given the recommendation made by the leader, bl, there is an equilibrium in the
second stage where the two workers choose their actions such that
a∗(bl) ∈ arg max
a
pil,
b∗(bl) ∈ arg max
b
pif .
Let U denote the value of the outside option for worker 2.11 The leader’s maximization
problem can be written as
maxbl pil(a
∗(bl), b∗(bl) (3)
pif (b
∗, a∗) ≥ U.. (4)
Solving the problem, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. With authority, introducing a small status differential increases the value of
the organization, piorg, compared to the case of identical status if
2f ′(0+)− f ′(0−) < 0. (5)
11The qualitative result does not depend on the outside option. See Appendix D.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 shows that the firm benefits from status differentiation when Equation (5)
is satisfied, which means that status differentiation does not make the low-status worker too
unhappy, i.e. f ′(0−) is not too small. The intuition is that without status differential, all
workers are treated equally, so no one will be unhappy about being placed under another
worker. With status differential, a leader creates more value by improving coordination, but the
follower, who has lower status, will be unhappy. Increasing status differentiation is desirable
when the benefit of improved coordination outweighs the cost of upsetting the low-status
worker.
The crucial difference between Equation (2) and Equation (5) is that with authority, status
differentiation is preferred even when the low-status worker suffers a slightly larger loss than the
benefit enjoyed by the high-status worker. Formally, when status differential has a symmetric
effect on high- and low-status workers, i.e. f ′(0+) = f ′(0−), Equation (5) is always satisfied,
but not for Equation (2) (see Proposition 2.). The reason is that with authority, the leader
can further improve coordination by making a recommendation that helps induce the follower
to do what the leader wants, an instrument that is absent in the case without authority.
This has interesting implications for the design of employees’ tasks on the promotion ladder.
The case of status differentiation without authority can be interpreted as the firm introduces
status differentiation by promoting a worker to be the leader, but does not change his job
duty, meaning if he is responsible for task a before promotion, he still performs the same task
after promotion. For example, in academics, the main responsibility of professors is to teach
and to do research, whether they are promoted or not; similarly for doctors in the healthcare
industry and other specialized professions.12 The case of status differentiation with authority
can be interpreted as changing the leader’s responsibilities upon promotion, for example, while
he performs task a before promotion, he is responsible for both tasks a and b after promotion.
This is applicable to many private and public sectors, where managers perform a very different
role from junior workers. The result then implies that if promotion involves job changes, it
does not hurt to increase status differentiation among workers compared to the case when
promotions do not involve a change in responsibilities.
While Proposition 3 is robust to variation in the functional form of f(s), under large status
differential the optimal actions depend on the limit of f(s). To keep things simple, consider
the case where
f(s) =
{
1
1+s
if s ≥ 0
2− 1
1−s if s < 0.
(6)
We can then show that
Proposition 4. With authority, large status differentiation reduces the value of the organiza-
tion, piorg.
Proof. See Appendix D.
12Auriol and Renault’s (2008) also discuss incentives and promotions, but promotions in their model do not
involve job changes.
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Figure 1: Identical or Differentiated Status.
When large status differentiation is introduced, the low-status worker becomes very un-
happy and a large distortion in the leader’s action with respect to the first-best level is needed
in order to induce the follower to participate. More particularly, introducing status differential
reduces the leader’s cost but increases the follower’s cost. The larger the status differential
is, the lower is the leader’s cost, and the more willing he is to distort his action in order to
compensate the disutility of the follower arising from lower status. As a consequence, it is not
optimal to differentiate status among workers when such loss from distortion more than offsets
the gain in improved coordination.
Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 3 and 4. It compares the value of organization with different
status differentials, which is shown with a solid line, and that without status differential, which
is drawn as a dotted line when Equation (6) is satisfied. It shows that it is profitable for the
firm to introduce some status differentiation, but not too much.
This result relates to the literature on status. The basic result of this literature is that
workers are willing to work hard to improve their status in organizations, and therefore status
generates work incentives (see, for instance, Moldovanu et al., 2007; Auriol and Renault, 2008;
Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2010). However, agents in these models do not have different favorite
choice of action. In reality, differences of opinion between individual workers and between
departments within a firm on different stages of a production process, ranging from product
design to input sourcing, manufacturing and delivery of the final product, are very common.
When vested interests are at work, I show that too much status differences may exacerbate
conflict over workers’ preferred actions, and hence distorts coordination. This result highlights
the cost of status, which must be traded off against the benefit of raising work incentives
10
emphasized in the previous literature.
3 Robustness: Does status create or destroy money?
Under the assumption of complementary between status and costs, status may create or destroy
money for the firm, depending on the functional form of f(s). More specifically, “creating
money” means that workers are better off by simply gaining a label of high status. Thus, by
introducing status, the firm can pay less without losing the workers. However, in this case, the
result that it is profitable for the firm to introduce status will not be interesting because it is
driven by the fact that status creates extra money for the firm. In what follows, I show that in
this model, a small status differential increases the value of the organization and at the same
time destroys money, so that my results are not driven by the complementarity assumption.
Let C denote the total costs of action for the workers:
C = f(s)(1− a)2 + f(−s)b2.
Status destroys money when evaluated at s = 0 if the total costs for the workers are higher
with status than without. Formally,
∂C
∂s
|s=0 > 0,
which is satisfied if
1
16
(f ′(0+)− f ′(0−)) + 1
2
(
∂b(s)
∂s
− ∂(a(s)
∂s
)|s=0 > 0. (7)
If the impact of status on cost is symmetric for the high- and low-status workers, then
Condition (7) is satisfied when Equation (5) holds, which implies that a small status differential
increases the value of the organization and at the same time destroys money. Even if the impact
of status is asymmetric such that agents are more willing to avoid low status than they are to
gain high status as suggested by the Prospect Theory, i.e. f ′(0+) − f ′(0−) > 0, the result in
Proposition 3 remains valid provided Equation (5) is satisfied.
4 Conclusion
While the literature typically focuses on how status concerns affect, at the micro level, work
incentives within organizations, and at the macro level, labor market issues such as the quality
of matches between firms and workers, the determination of equilibrium wage and output, this
paper addresses different issues: their impact on coordination and promotions. In particular, I
characterize two conditions under which it is profitable for firms to introduce status differentia-
tion: when status affects workers in an asymmetric way, and when status comes with authority.
I also discuss the implications on promotions: large status differentiation is more beneficial to
the firm when promotion involves a change in job duties compared to without such a change.
This suggests that the effect of status will be different in different organizations, depending no
whether there are significant changes in responsibilities at a higher position.
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There are several directions in which this analysis can be extended. First, one may want
to endogenize s. In this model, status is exogenously determined, although I can easily show
that the optimal s∗ is at some intermediate value (see Figure 1). It seems equally interesting
to correlate status with workers’ effort. This is because, in reality, workers may compete for
a higher position, and the firm can promote, and thus award a higher status to, the worker
who produces larger profits. To see its effect, we can introduce a new stage of competition
for promotion before the previous game. In this new stage, two workers with identical status
compete, and the one who produces higher profit (or equivalently lower cost) wins the leader
position and is awarded a higher status in the next stage. Worker 1 will choose a > 3/4, since
it improves his chance of winning the promotion and thereby earning more as a leader in the
next period, even though it lowers his first-period profit, while worker 2 will choose b < 1/4
for similar reasons. Increasing status differentiation therefore worsens coordination. This is
because the prospect of promotion causes the two workers to focus on their own agenda in
minimizing costs rather than improving coordination.
Second, status is only one of many ways incentives are provided in organizations. Another
important incentive contract is performance pay based on revenue, but the main results are
robust to this compensation scheme because the introduction of this scheme would only af-
fect the share of revenues between workers, but they would not affect the costs of actions, in
other words, priority access to resources and the power of issuing orders, and hence would not
affect the analysis of status. However, it is possible that other more sophisticated compensa-
tion schemes such as bonuses and stock options might improve efficiency over revenue-sharing
schemes considered here. By assuming that actions are unobservable (hence, noncontractible),
the focus of this paper is not on optimal contracts. Although optimal contracts have been
analyzed extensively in a different literature (see Gibbons and Roberts (2013) for a survey),
status—and hence the issue of whether status rewards or other incentive contracts fare better—
has been largely ignored. Thus, further work on this issue could be fruitful.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider the possibility of hiring a leader from outside the
firm instead of promoting a worker from within, which broadens the modes of coordination from
one (internal leader only) to two (internal vs. external leader). In reality, there are advantages
and disadvantages to recruiting internally or externally. While external recruitment brings
fresh ideas to the firm, internal candidates know the firm’s culture better and the firm knows
the candidates’ abilities better. Thus, external recruitment may be more relevant for certain
industries, where innovations are more important, than others.
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting a∗ and b∗ into Equation (1), we obtain
piorg =
2f(s)f(−s)[1 + 2f(s) + 2f(−s)]
[f(s) + f(−s) + 2f(s)f(−s)]2 .
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Differentiating and simplifying it, we have
∂piorg
∂s
|s=0 = −f ′(0+) + f ′(0−)
Therefore, when status differentiation is limited (i.e. s→ 0),
∂piorg
∂s
|s=0 > 0 if f ′(0+) < f ′(0−).
B Proof of Proposition 2
For large s, suppose f(+∞) and f(−∞) exist. Let f+ denote f(+∞) and f− denote f(−∞).
Then piorg(s→ +∞) > 5/8 (where 5/8 is the profit without status differential) if
2f+f−(1 + 2f+ + 2f−)
(f+ + f− + 2f+f−)2
>
5
8
,
which depends on the exact value of f+ and f−.
Consider a special case where status affects both workers’ costs in a symmetric way, i.e.
f(s)−f(0) = f(0)−f(−s). Rearranging it, we have f++f− = 2f(0) = 2. The above condition
then becomes
10f+f−
(2 + 2f+f−)2
>
5
8
⇔ (1− f+f−)2 < 0,
which is never satisfied.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Given bl, the equilibrium actions are given by:
a∗v =
2f(s)
1 + 2f(s)
+
f(s)
[f(s) + f(−s) + s+ 2f(s)(f(−s) + s)](1 + 2f(s))
+
sbl
f(s) + f(−s) + s+ 2f(s)(f(−s) + s) ,
b∗v =
f(s) + sbl(1 + 2f(s))
f(s) + f(−s) + s+ 2f(s)(f(−s) + s) .
Since a∗v|s=0 = 3/4 and b∗v|s=0 = 1/4, the impact of introducing a small status differential on
the value of the organization is as follows:
∂piorg
∂s
|s=0 = [−2(a− b)(∂a
∂s
− ∂b
∂s
) + 2(1− a)∂a
∂s
− 2b∂b
∂s
]s=0
=
1
2
(
∂b(s, bl)
∂s
− ∂a(s, bl)
∂s
)|s=0.
Using b∗v = (1 + 2f(s))a
∗
v − 2f(s), we obtain
∂piorg
∂s
|s=0 = 1
3
∂b
∂s
|s=0 − 1
12
f ′(0+).
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Differentiating pil with respect to bl gives
∂pil
∂bl
= 0⇔ 2f(s)(1− a∗v)
∂a∗v
∂bl
− (a∗v − b∗v)(
∂a∗v
∂bl
− ∂b
∗
v
∂bl
) = 0
⇔ 2f(s)(1− a∗v)
∂a∗v
∂bl
− 2f(s)(b∗v − a∗v)
∂a∗v
∂bl
= 0
⇔ b∗v = 1.
Hence, we have a∗v = b
∗
v = 1, which violates the follower’s participation constraint, Equation
(4). Therefore, the choice of bl is such that Equation (4) binds, which means
pif (a
∗
v(s, bl), b
∗
v(s, bl)) = U.
By Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain
∂b
∂s
|s=0 = −1
2
f ′(0+) +
3
8
f ′(0−).
Therefore,
∂piorg
∂s
|s=0 = −1
4
f ′(0+) +
1
8
f ′(0−),
which is positive if
2f ′(0+)− f ′(0−) < 0.
D Proof of Proposition 4
When status differential is very large (i.e. s→∞),
lims→∞f(s) =lims→∞
1
1 + s
= 0,
lims→−∞f(s) =lims→−∞(2− 1
1− s) = 2,
and
a = b = bl.
Since the disobedience cost is too big with large status differential, the follower will choose
b = bl. The leader will choose a = b, creating perfect coordination, because his cost of action
is very small.
The optimal bl is determined by the follower’s participation constraint:
1
2
− 2b2l = U.
Clearly, bl is decreasing in U , and bl = 1/2 if U = 0. Moreover, the value of the organization,
given by
piorg = 1− (1− bl)2 − b2l ,
is increasing in bl ∈ [0, 1/2]. Therefore, piorg is maximized at U = 0. Even if the follower’s
outside option is zero, the value of the organization with status differential, piorg = 1/2, is less
than that without, 5/8. Thus, for any positive outside option, it is not optimal to differentiate
workers.
14
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